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Powell v. Commonwealth
552 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 2001)
L Facs
On January29, 1999, Stacey Lynn Reed ("Stacey") was murdered and her
sister, Kristie Erin Reed ("Kristie"), was raped, bound, stabbed and partially
strangled. Stacey's autopsy revealed numerous abrasions and injuries and that a
knife wound to the heart was the cause of her death. Kristie survived the brutal
incident and identified her attacker as Paul Warner Powell ("Powell"). Powell
and Staceywere acquainted for more than two years. Profiles of DNA found on
Powell's knife matched profiles of Stacey's DNA and profiles of DNA found on
Kristie matched Powell's DNA profile. Powell admitted to numerous individuals
that he had committed the acts and he also shared details about the rape and
murder with others.'
In May 1999, Powell was indicted on multiple counts, however his appeal
only concerned the following four counts: (1) capital murder in the commission
of a robbery and/or attempted robbery; (2) attempted capital murder in the
commission of a rape; (3) abduction with intent to defile; and (4) rape. Powell
made motions to have the capital statutes declared unconstitutional and to strike
the capital indictments, which the trial court denied. Four months later, in
September, the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment to add the
capital mu-der of Stacey during or subsequent to the rape and sodomy of
Kristie.2 The trial court granted the amendment over Powell's objection that the
amendment changed the nature or character of the offense charged.' Also during
the pre-trial phase, Powell made a motion for, and was granted, a mental health
expert. However, Powell refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert,
violating the reciprocity requirement under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.3:1.
The Commonwealth moved to exclude Powell's expert because of his non-
1. Powellv. Commonwealth, 552 S.E2d 344, 347-48 (Va. 2001).
2. Sw gma1y VA. CODE ANN. S 192-231 (vfichie 2000) (allowing that "[i]f there be any
defect in form in any iditent, .. , the court may permit amendment of such indictment,...
provided the amendment does not change the nature or character of the offense charged).
3. PouA 552 S.E2d at 349.
4. See gmuy VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1)-(2) (Mchie 2000) (requiring the
defendant to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert and allowing that a failure to do so may
result in exclusion of the defendant's expert bythe court). But see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68
(1985) (holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to a mental health expert to assist in his
defense). Therefore, practitioners should attempt to obtain an expert under Ake first to avoid
riggerng the reciprocity requirement.
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cooperation. The court indefinitely deferred the Commonwealth's motion to
exclude Powell's expert.'
During voir dire, Powell questioned the jurors about their abilityto consider
specific mitigation evidence. The Commonwealth objected to this questioning;
in response, the trial court limited the scope of Powell's questions. Three jurors
were seated over Powell's objections. One juror was struck for cause on the
Commonwealth's motion.6
During the guilt phase of the trial, a report was read into evidence which
indicated that the witnesses saw Powell and the victims together. Powell moved
for a mistrial alleging that this evidence had not been provided to the defense
according to the discoveryrles and that it prejudiced Powell's defense. The trial
court denied Powell's motion after finding that the evidence was not exculpatory
and that the objection was untimely because it was not made until the close of
the Commonwealth's case. Powell also moved to strike the charges against him
based on insufficient evidence and the wording of the indictment. The trial court
denied this motion as well. Prior to the deliberation phase, Powell objected to
several of the proposed juryinstructions. Specificallyhe argued that the instruc-
tions needed to indicate clearly the rape-murder connection and to define more
accurately a "willful, deliberate and premeditated" killing. The trial court over-
ruled these objections and denied Powell's suggested instruction.7
The Commonwealth, in its dosing argument, stated that Powell had at-
tempted to rob Stacey, saying that "it's as likely as anyscenario - but we'll never
know because he hasn't told us."' Powell immediatelyobjected asserting that the
Commonwealth had impermissibly alluded to Powell's reliance on his Fifth
Amendment right not to testify against himself. The court deferred Powel's
objection until the end of the Commonwealth's dosing. The trial court denied
Powell's motion for mistrial, but gave a curative instruction. During delibera-
tions, the jury asked the court whether Kristie's rape satisfied the gradation
requirement for Stacey's capital murder. The judge answered the jury's question
in the affirmative, to which Powell objected.' Powell was convicted of capital
murder, attempted capital murder, rape, and abduction. The jurors were polled
5. Poumd 552 S.E.2d at 349.
6. Id at 349-50 (striking juror O'Dell for cause because she had not determined her position
on the death penalty and was unsure of whether she would be able to follow the court's instruc-
tions).
7. Id at 352. Powell failed to offer alternative instructions to some of the Commonwea's
objectionable ins rtis. 1d at 351. Defense counsel should always proffer his own complete set
of instructions, and at least proffer instructions in rebuttal to anyharmful instructions proffered byteCommonwealh.
8. Id at 352.
9. Specificallythe judge responded, "Yes. Murder in (t]he [clommission of a rape is a killing
which takes place before, during or after the rape and is so doselyrelated thereto in time, place, and
causal connection as to maie the killing part of the same criminal enterprise as the rape." Id




and theystated that the gradation offense relied upon for the capital offense was
rape.
10
Prior to the commencement of the sentencing phase, the trial court ruled
that Powell's expert would not be allowed to testify due to Powell's failure to
cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert.11 During the sentencing phase, the
trial court allowed the Commonweakh to introduce testimony that Powell had
committed burglaries in the past. Further, Powell refused to present any evi-
dence in mitigation, which caused Powell's counsel to move for a competency
evaluation, which the trial court denied. 2 The Commonwealth proffered an
instruction that listed death, fife, and life plus a fine as possible punishments if
the jurors found either or both aggravators, and that the jury could impose fife
or life plus a fine if it found no aggravator. In contrast, Powell offered two
instructions: the first instruction stated the possible sentences, and the second
instruction stated that even if the jury found an aggravator, it could still impose
a sentence of life or fife plus a fine. The trial court used the Commonwealth's
instruction. The Commonwealth also proffered five verdict forms that provided
for the following possible findings: (1) a sentence of death upon the finding of
both aggravators; (2) a sentence of death upon the finding of future dangerous-
ness; (3) a sentence of death upon a finding of vileness; (4) a sentence of life; and
(5) a sentence of life and a fine up to $100,000. Powell objected to the Common-
wealth's forms, but the trial court found the forms to be an adequate representa-
tion of the law. The jury sentenced Powell to death based on a finding of
vileness in the commission of the crime. Powell was also sentenced to three life
terms and $200,000 in fines for the other convictions."
On August 10, 2000, the trial court held Powell's sentencing hearing to
determine whether the sentence recommended bythe juryshould be imposed. 4
Powell presented his jury's forewoman, Jennifer Day ("Day"), who testified that
the judge's affirmative answer on the rape as a gradation offense question had
been "the determining factor" in her guilty vote, and that she would have voted
for life if the verdict form had indicated that life was a possible sentence when
the jury found an aggravating factor.S However, on cross-examination, Day
testified that she had sent Powell explicit sexual information and money. The
trial court found Day's testimony tainted and confirmed the verdicts and sen-
tences. Powell appealed his non-capital convictions, which were consolidated
10. Id
11. Ssnzote4.
12. Segu/4Ross E. Eisenber 7beLaw sRdeW hemtbetSaesDtb, 14 CAP.
DEF. 155 (2001) (discussing an attorney's ethical obligations when a client wants death).
13. Poud, 552 S.E2d at 353-54.
14. SaenUyVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264-5 (Mlchie 2000) (requiring the court to determine
the appropriateness of the death sentence based on the pre-sentence report).
15. Pou 552 S.E2d at 354.
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with the automatic review of his death sentence. 6 Powell raised twenty-five
assignments of error in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.'
I Hadig
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Powell's capital murder conviction,
affirmed his non-capital convictions, and remanded the case for a possible retrial
of first degree murder or less.' The court made the following eight separate
decisions to reach this outcome: (1) the capital punishment statutes are constitu-
tional; (2) the amendment of the indictment changed the nature of the offense;
(3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting jurors; (4) Powell's
motion for mistrial based on the Commonwealth's discovery violation was
untimely, (5) the trial court gave an incorrect instruction regarding the gradation
offense of rape; (6) the Commonwealth's comment on Powell's failure to testify
was improper, (7) evidence of the abduction was sufficient; and (8) verdict forms
must indicate to the jury that a sentence other than death may be imposed even
when an aggravator is found.'9
Iff. A nibsis /Applarw in Vij?;
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Powell's coniction on the amend-
ment issue, the second issue that it addressed. 0 The court went on to address
six additional issues because it wanted to "take the opportunityprovided by this
case to address several other issues that are critical to the proper prosecution of
capital murder cases and will be instructive of such future cases."2' This preface
to the decision provides extra weight to convince any court that it should follow
the rationale and rules laid out in this opinion.
16. SeegmdlyVA. GODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Mlchie 2000) (requiri the Supreme Court of
Virginia to review a sentence of death and allowing the court to consolidate other appeals with this
mandatory revieW).
17. PoudA, 552 S.E2d at 355. Powell raised seven other issues which the court declined to
address: failure to strike the Commonwealth's vileness evidence, admission of hearsay, exclusion
of Powell's mental health expert, evidence of umadjudicaed acts, denial of a competencyevaluation,
denial of Powell's proffered instructions, and the trial court's denial to set aside the death sentence.
1. at 355 n.6.
18. Id at 363. The Supreme Court of Vigina would have been unable to find that Powell
was acquitted of the capital murder based on robbery had Powell not requested that the jury be
polled. Therefore, it is very important that the capital practitioner request that the jury be polled
specifkally on issues such as the gradation crime and the aggravator.
19. IL at 355-63.
20. IA at 356-57.
21. Id at 355.
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A. Prdiez A risigfivn A nm the In&vnt
1. TheM ukpl C6- ssi
In addressing the amendment of the indictment, the court needed to decide
whether an indictment charging one theory of capital murder may be amended
to include a separate and distinct second theory of capital murder. The original
indictment only charged Powell under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(4) for
murder in connection with a robbery, while the amendment added charges under
Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(5) for murder in connection with rape or
sodomy.22 The Commonwealth made a separate amended indictment with only
one charge.23 The court found that this Language "expanded the indictment to
include a new and additional charge of capital murder" because it allowed the
possibilitythat Powell could receive two capital nurder convictions; he could be
convicted of murder in connection with robberyand murder in connection with
rape.24 This holding instructs that the Commonwealth may not amend an
indictment to include an alternative and additional theory of the same crime
alreadycharged. While the court's decision relied on Virginia Code Section 192-
231,25 a purely statutory argument maybe made that adding additional forms of
capital murder violates the grand jury statute because the amended indictment
includes a separate offense upon which the grand jury has not made a probable
26cause determination.
Additionally, a possible duplicityproblem exists when the Commonwealth
amends an indictment to include two types of capital murder in one count. PouSJ
and Paym v Ccamwma/l both suggest that each individual subsection in
Virginia Code Section 182-31 is a separate and freestanding offense.28 If each
subsection is a separate offense, it is duplicitous to charge two forms of capital
murder in the same count. However, in Buwm v Qj u t,2 9 the indictment
22. Poude, 552 S.E.2d at 348; seealsoVA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(4), (5) (Nfichie Supp. 2001).
23. Po... 552 SE2d at 349. Specifically the indictment read: "Paul Warner Powell, did
feloniously, willfully, deliberately and premeditatedly kill and murder one Stacey Lynn Reed while
in the commission of robbery and/or attempted robbery, and/or during the commission of or
subsequent to rape and/or attempted rape and/or forcible sodomy /or attempted forcible
sodomy, in violation of Virginia Code Section 182-31." Commonwealth v. Powell, No.45693 (Va.
Cir. CL May 1, 2000) (Crcuit Court for Prince William County).
24. Poud 552 S.E2d at 356-57. Note that this analysis should be the same if the amendment
had been made to a sinle count in a mu-count indictment.
25. Se#gemrly VA. CODE ANN. S 192-231 (lchie 2000) (allowing amendment if nature or
character of offense is unchanged).
26. PoudJ, 552 S1.2d at 356-57; seeVA. CODE ANN. S 192.200 (lfchie 2000) (requiring the
grand jury to inquire and present all felonies).
27. 509 SE.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
28. Payne v. Commonwealh, 509 S1E2d 293 (Va. 1999) (holding that Payne could receive
four death sentences under the capital murder statute when only two victims were killed).
29. 541 S.E2d 872 (Va. 2001).
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was amended to include robbery and rape in a single count.3 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the indictment because it "contained only one
charge of capital murder and merelyprovided akemative 'gradation' offenses."3
The inconsistency between these cases makes the state of the law unclear, thus
each indictment and any proposed amendments should be scrutinized for the
problems raised herein and objected to immediately.
32
2. The Rape Isswe
The Commonwealth also made an error in the language it used in the rape
gradation offense. The Commonwealth, instead of using the language in the
current statute allowing for a killing b during or after a rape, used former
statutory language that excluded a killing before a rape." Prior to the amend-
ment of Code Section 18.2-31(e) in 1988, the statute used the language "[t]he
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a person during the commission of,
orsubsequent to, rape."34 The Commonwealth used this language. Code Section
18.2-31(5) now reads "[the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any
person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape. 35 The
use of the former statutorylanguage prevented the Commonwealth from obtain-
ing an instruction that the rape, as a gradation offense, could come after the
killing.3-6 The problem arises from the fact that Stacey was murdered first, and
then Kristie was raped. Even if onlyone victim were involved, Powell still could
not have been charged in this manner.
Further, the trial court erred in affirmatively telling the jury that Kristie's
rape satisfied the gradation requirement for Stacey's capital murder.37 This court
emphasized how the exact language of the indictment is important because "the
Commonwealth is limited to the prosecution of the crime charged in the indict-
ment."38 Therefore, defense counsel should always scrutinize the indictment for
any possible problems or errors that may result in some form of relief for the
defendant.
30. See Buns v. Commonweah, 541 S.E.2d 872, 882 (Va. 2001) (aflowing the indictment
to be amended).
31. Id
32. See ga/yJeffreyD. Fazio, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 131 (2001) (analyzi= Burns v.
Commonweatah, 541 SX.2d 872 (Va. 2001) and explaining how to make duplicity and multiplicity
arguments).
33. PoudI, 552 S.E.2d at 359 (citing Harward v. Commnonweal 330 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va.
1985)).
34. VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(e) (Mlchi 1985).
35. VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(5) (Mcbchie Supp. 2001).
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B. The COmmuadkh's CfavgA ,n ?r
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that it was error for the Common-
wealth to state in its closing "he hasn't told us" in reference to Powell's
motives." The court stated that this comment was likely to be taken as a com-
ment on Powell's failure to testify, and therefore, was improper.4° The court
further held this error to be harmless, however, because Powell's capital convic-
tion was already reversed on other grounds." While this Fifth Amendment
violation is obvious, it is important to note that Powell's counsel objected at the
moment the phrase was uttered. Objecting at the moment a prejudicial statement
is made during arguments is vital to avoid procedurally defaulting the issue. 2
C Smma g Ven&t Fwi
The last issue the court addressed in reviewing Powell's case was the
appropriate type of juryverdict forms in capital sentencing. This issue was byfar
the most important because the court fundamentally changed the standard for
capital sentencing verdict forms. 4 The court considered this part of the decision
"critical to the proper prosecution of capital murder cases."4
The court first analyzed Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(D), which sets out
forms for the juryverdict and the requirements of the verdict form. 41 Under the
Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis, the statute is problematic in three major
ways. 4 First, the statute fails to mention the sentencing possibility of a life
sentence and a fine altogether.' Second, the aggravating factors are listed as "or"
propositions when the jurymayfind both aggravators.4' Third, the grammatical
strcture of the statute appears to require part of the vileness definition in every
verdict form regardless of whether vileness is at issue.49
The court contrasted Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4 with Virginia Code
Section 18.2-10, which was amended in 1991 to include the sentencing option of
39. Id at 360.
40. Id
41. Id at 359-60.
42. Ste Mack v. Commonwealth, 454 .E.2d 750, 752 (Va. C App. 1995) (holding that
objection at the close of the Commonwealth's argument was not timely); Russo v. Commonwealth,
148 S.E.2d 820, 824-25 (Va. 1966) (holding that objection made at conclusion of Commonwealth's
opening argument waived the objection to the improper statement made in opening); seeaso Ashley
Flynn, PmarxaazrDfam A DeFacto Exapm toCiilir, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 289 (2000); Matthew K.
Mahoney, Brig dhe PaiwDq Dz iarn; 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000).
43. Poudl 552 S.E2d at 361-63.
44. Id at 361.
45. Id at 361-62; seeaso VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D) (Mlichie 2000) (requiring verdict
in writing and setting out two example forms).
46. Potud, 552 S.E,2d at 362-63.
47. Id at 362.
48. Id at n.15.
49. Id
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life plus a fine. The court held that the conflict between the two statutes could
onlybe resolved byinvalidating the less specific statute, Section 19.2-264.4(D).5"
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia now requires that "the trial court must
give the jury verdict forms providing expressly for the imposition of a sentence
of imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $100,000 when the jury
finds that one or both of the aggravating factors have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."52 Further, the court referred to this holding as a "minimum"
requirement.53 Therefore, every capital defendant should urge the trial court to
permit a far more explanatoryverdict form to ensure the jury's complete under-
standing of its sentencing options.
This idea is cemented bythe court's consideration of the Commonwealth's
argument that a problem like that in A tkim v Cawvtb 5 was not present."
InA tii, the trial court correctlyinstructed the jury, but the verdict forms given
to the jury did not include forms allowing for a life sentence or a life plus a fine
sentence if the jury found neither vileness or future dangerousness. 6 The
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Atkins's sentence because the verdict forms
confused the jury into believing "that it was required first to find that at least one
of the aggravating factors was present."" In this case, the Commonwealth
attempted to distinguish A tkins byasserting that the juryforms provided the jury
with all of the possible sentencing options, and that no Atkim problem was
present because the instructions given by the court and the verdict forms were
not in conflict.
58
In response, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the issue presented
by this case was not addressed in A tkr. The issue in A tkim was whether the
"jury was provided with the means to discharge its obligation," while in this
case the issue was juryconfusion when the verdict forms did not "expresslystate
that the jury is allowed to fix a sentence of life imprisonment even though one
or both aggravating factors are present."60 Therefore, the court's holding is an
extension of theA tkim rule.6 Thus, taking the general principals espoused in the
50. Id at 361-62. SW g&nUdy VA. CODE ANN. S 191-264.4 0icwhie 2000) (setting out
sentencing scherme for capital cases); VA. CODE ANN. S 182-10(a) (Mich ieSupp. 2001) (listing the
three possible punishments for a class 1 felony).
51. PodA, 552 S.E.2d at 362-63; se aso VA. CODE ANN. S192-264.4(D).
52. Pod1 552 S.E2d at 363.
53. Id at 362.
54. 510 SE.d 445 (Va. 1999).
55. Axkins v.Commonwealth, 510 S.E2d 445 (Va. 1999) (reversing the defendant's sentence
because of incorrect verdict forms).
56. Id at 456.
57. Id at 457.
58. PodJ, 552 S.E.2d at 361-63.
59. Id at 361-62.




two cases together, the Supreme Court of Virginia advocates clarity in jury
instructions and verdict forms.
The court invalidated the statutorymodel verdict forms in this case. Verdict
forms provided bythe Model Jury Instruction Committee have been revised in
light of Poudl.62 However, the new model verdict forms remain inadequate
because the life sentence forms contain language requiring the jury to consider
mitigation evidence. The defendant in a capital case is never required to presentmitigation evidence. The forms implythat once the juryhas found an aggravator
it must sentence the defendant to death unless he has presented mitigation
evidence. Thus, the verdict forms put at least a burden of production on the
defendant. The court in Poudi was specific:
We hold that in a capital murder [ ] trial, the trial court must give the
juryverdict forms providing expresslyfor the imposition of a sentence
of mnprisonment or life and a fine of not more than $100 000 when
the jury finds that one or both of the aggravating factors have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.63
This language requires forms which permit the jury to impose a life sentence
without consideration of mitigation evidence. Therefore, a set of forms should
be developed and used that provide for the following: (1) the juryto find both
future dangerousness and vileness, without mitigation, and recommend life; (2)
a finding of future dangerousness, without mitigation, and a recommendation of
life; and (3) a finding of vileness, without mitigation, and a recommendation of
life. 4
IV. Cba?/on
Three tools may be gained from the Supreme Court of Virginia's. holding
in this case. First, defense counsel should always proffer favorable jury instruc-
tions and verdict forms and urge the trial court to accept them under this case
and the A kim case. Second, this case illustrates how errors in the indictment
may prove fatal to the Commonwealth's case; thus, indictments should be
thoroughlyexamined. Third, the Commonwealth maynot at anytime comment
on the defendant's failure to take the stand, and if the Commonwealth makes
statements that maybe impermissible, an objection should be made immediately.
Kathryn Roe Eldridge
62. Seepgowly VA. MODELJURYINSTRLUJCONQUMINALNos. P33.130A-P33.130G (Lexis
Law Publishing 2001).
63. PoudZ 552 S.E.2d at 363.
64. See grmUy Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, Verdict Forms, Second Edition,
Alternative 1-Alternative 10, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 233 (2001).
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